Medicare Advantage Reforms: Comparing House and Senate Bills by Brian Biles & Grace Arnold
Issue Brief
December 2009
Medicare Advantage Reforms: 
Comparing House and Senate Bills
Brian Biles and Grace arnold
ABSTRACT: The Medicare Advantage (MA) program, which enables Medicare beneficia-
ries to enjoy private health plan coverage, is a major element of the current health care 
reform discussion on Capitol Hill—in large part because payments to MA plans in 2009 
are expected to run at least $11 billion more than traditional Medicare would have cost. 
While the pending Senate and House bills both endeavor to reduce these extra MA pay-
ments, their approaches are different. The bills also differ on other aspects of reforming the 
MA program, such as plans’ allowable geographic areas, their risk-adjustment systems and 
reporting requirements, their potential bonuses for achieving high-quality care and provid-
ing good management, and their beneficiary protections. This issue brief compares the 
above and other provisions in the House and Senate bills, which have a common overall 
goal to improve the value that Medicare obtains for the dollars it spends.
                    
OveRview
The Medicare Advantage (MA) program, which enables Medicare beneficiaries to 
enjoy private health plan coverage, is a major element of the current health care 
reform discussion on Capitol Hill. Because payments to MA plans in 2009 are 
expected to run at least $11 billion more than traditional Medicare would have 
cost, such excesses were identified early in the development of health care reform 
proposals as a possible source of savings that would help make the final legisla-
tion deficit-neutral. In the House of Representatives bill, the savings over 10 
years are expected to total $170 billion; in the Senate bill, $118 billion. 
The Senate and House approaches to reducing MA extra payments, as 
might be surmised, are markedly different. The House system would base MA 
plan payments on average Medicare fee-for-service costs in each county. The 
Senate system would be based on plan bids (reflecting actual plan costs, as 
opposed to statutorily set rates); payments would reflect the averages of bids, 
weighted by the numbers of MA plans’ enrollees in a state’s metropolitan areas 
and individual rural counties. Both the House and Senate bills would provide 
additional payments to MA plans that have higher quality-rating scores. 
To learn more about new publications 
when they become available, visit the 
Fund's Web site and register to receive 
e-mail alerts.
Commonwealth Fund pub. 1357 
Vol. 74
The mission of The Commonwealth 
Fund is to promote a high performance 
health care system. The Fund carries 
out this mandate by supporting 
independent research on health care 
issues and making grants to improve 
health care practice and policy. Support 
for this research was provided by 
The Commonwealth Fund. The views 
presented here are those of the authors 
and not necessarily those of The 
Commonwealth Fund or its directors, 
officers, or staff.
For more information about this study, 
please contact:
Brian Biles, M.D., M.P.H.
Department of Health Policy
School of Public Health  
and Health Services
The George Washington University
bbiles@gwu.edu
2 The commonwealTh Fund
not match that rate, they would be unable to compete. 
The TEFRA policy also required plans with estimated 
costs below their payment rate to apply that difference 
toward the provision of additional benefits not avail-
able in traditional Medicare—including lower deduct-
ibles or copayments. These additional benefits were 
understood to make enrollment in plans financially 
attractive to beneficiaries compared with FFS Medicare 
plus Medigap supplemental coverage—at least with 
regard to deductibles and coinsurance.  
In an effort to encourage more widespread use 
of private plans in Medicare, the Congress enacted 
policies to pay private plans more than local FFS costs 
in 1997, 2003, and 2006. As a result, private MA plans 
are now paid 114 percent—over $11 billion—more in 
2009 than it would have cost the federal government 
had those 10 million MA enrollees participated in tra-
ditional Medicare.2 
Over the past two years, Barack Obama, first as 
a presidential candidate and now as president, has con-
sistently stated that these extra payments to Medicare 
private plans constitute wasteful federal spending and 
This issue brief analyzes the MA payment 
policy provisions in the House and Senate bills. In 
addition, it discusses their other MA provisions, includ-
ing those related to risk adjustment, beneficiary protec-
tions, and Special Needs Plans. 
MediCARe AdvAnTAge PAyMenT POliCy
Since 1971, the basic rationale for including health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) and other private 
plans as options in Medicare has been that they can 
provide care more efficiently than the unorganized fee-
for-service (FFS) health care system.1 Under policies 
proposed by the Reagan administration and adopted in 
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 
(TEFRA), Medicare HMOs were paid 95 percent of 
the projected average costs of traditional FFS Medicare 
in each county (average adjusted per-capita cost, or 
AAPCC), with the federal government realizing as sav-
ings the remaining 5 percent. 
The approach to paying private plans in 
Medicare was that if they could provide care more 
efficiently than the AAPCC-based payment rate, they 
would succeed in attracting enrollees, and if they could 
Exhibit 1. Medicare Advantage Payment Proposals as of November 2009
House of Representatives (HR 3962) Senate (HR 3590)
MA Payment MA payment policy transitions from the current approach to a fee-
for-service cost system that pays plans 100 percent of average 
Medicare FFS costs in each county. 
MA payment policy transitions from the current approach to a system that pays 
plans based on the area-wide average of plan bids, reflecting their actual costs. 
Transition to 
New Payments 
Payments transition to the new FFS cost system from 2011 to 
2013. 
In 2011, one-third of the county benchmark will be set at local 
FFS costs while two-thirds reflect current policy. In 2012, two-
thirds of the benchmark are to be set at local FFS costs and 
one-third reflect current policy. 
In 2013 and subsequently, local benchmarks will equal FFS 
Medicare costs in each county.
Payments transition to the plan-bid system from 2011 to 2014. 
In 2011 only, the MA per-capita-growth percentage will be reduced by 3 percent. 
In 2012, one-third of the benchmark will be set using the enrollment-weighted 
area average of plan bids for 2012 and two-thirds reflect current law. In 2013, 
two-thirds will be set using the enrollment-weighted area average of plan bids for 
2013 and one-third of the benchmark reflect current law. 
In 2014, the benchmark will be set using enrollment-weighted area average of 
plan bids from the previous year, increased by the per-capita-growth percentage. 
In 2015 and subsequently, the benchmark will be set using enrollment-weighted 
area average of plan bids for the current year.
Benchmarks based on the weighted average of plan bids may not exceed 
benchmarks provided under the current law’s formula.
Rebates No provision. Plans receive rebates equal to 100 percent of the difference between their plan 
costs and the benchmark, beginning in 2014.
Rebates must be used to provide extra benefits. Plans with costs above the 
benchmark must charge enrollees an additional premium  
for benefits.
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should be eliminated.3 Members of Congress have made 
similar observations in recent years.
Thus, provisions that would reduce or eliminate 
extra payments to MA plans have been included both 
in the House bill and Senate bills (Exhibit 1), and they 
serve not only to correct the current policy but also to 
provide a source of savings that would help offset the 
costs of expanded health insurance coverage and other 
health care reform initiatives. 
The current method of setting payment rates 
for MA plans involves a benchmark rate for each 
county (set by law) and a bid amount, submitted by 
each plan, that represents the expected cost of provid-
ing basic Medicare benefits to its enrollees. A plan 
with a bid less than the benchmark rate for the area it 
serves receives a payment rate equal to its bid plus a 
“rebate” equal to 75 percent of the difference between 
the benchmark rate and its bid; the plan must provide 
additional benefits equal in value to the rebate amount. 
A plan with a bid greater than the benchmark rate for 
the area it serves must charge beneficiaries a premium 
equal to the difference between its bid and the bench-
mark rate.
The House bill would set MA benchmark 
rates at 100 percent of FFS costs in each county and 
thus would pay plans approximately 100 percent 
of county FFS costs throughout the United States. 
This approach, supported by the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (MedPAC),4 is projected by the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to reduce federal 
spending by $154 billion over 10 years (2010–2019).5
The Senate bill would base the calculation of 
MA benchmarks on actual plan costs, as reflected in 
plan bids, rather than on statutorily set rates.6 MA plan 
bids in 2009 are estimated by MedPAC staff to aver-
age 101 percent of FFS costs nationwide, but because 
MA plans’ efficiency relative to local FFS costs varies 
greatly across the nation, this provision would set plan-
payment rates in some areas above the local average 
FFS costs and in other areas pay plans less than those 
local averages.7 The Senate bill also changes the rebate 
for each plan to 100 percent of the difference between 
the benchmark rate and the plan’s bid. CBO estimates 
that this approach would save the federal government 
$118 billion over 10 years.8 
One concern about the modification of MA pay-
ment rates is that people who are enrolled in MA plans 
(almost 25 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries in 
2009) might lose some or all of the additional benefits 
that are currently funded by the extra payments that 
plans receive.9 CBO projects that the House provision 
would decrease these additional benefits by about 60 
percent by 2019, with substantial variation across areas 
depending on their FFS costs, while the Senate provi-
sion would essentially eliminate additional benefits.10 
geOgRAPHiC UniT Of PAyMenT
While payments to MA plans have been determined 
at the county level since 1982, such plans are often 
available in geographic areas that include (at least parts 
of) multiple counties. As a result, MedPAC and others 
have suggested expanding MA payment areas to such 
broader geographic areas, which could more accurately 
reflect the markets in which MA plans operate. 
Thus the House bill, though it retains the 
county-based system of payments, directs the secre-
tary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to study 
the effects of paying plans based on larger geographic 
units. The Senate bill changes the MA geographic pay-
ment unit to core-based statistical areas (CBSAs).* 
Plans in rural areas not included in a CBSA would be 
paid the enrollee-weighted average of plan bids at the 
county level (Exhibit 2).
The major consideration in determining the 
appropriate definition of payment areas involves a 
tradeoff: the desire to establish uniform payment rates 
across a given market area (such as the Washington, 
D.C. metropolitan area) versus the recognition that uti-
lization and spending patterns vary substantially across 
*  These areas include metropolitan and micropolitan 
areas. Metro areas have a core urban area of at least 
50,000 people, while micro areas have a core urban 
area of 5,000–10,000 people. Outlying counties 
included in the CBSA are determined by of the 
degree to which the outlying county population 
commutes to the core area.  
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
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the counties of a metropolitan area (such as between 
the District of Columbia, Maryland’s Prince George’s 
County, and Virginia’s Arlington County). If the same 
rate were paid across all of the counties in a given met-
ropolitan area, plans could pursue various policies to 
encourage enrollment in low-cost areas while discour-
aging enrollment in high-cost areas.
RiSk AdjUSTMenT, OTHeR AdjUSTMenTS, 
And RePORTing ReqUiReMenTS
MA payments are risk-adjusted to account for the 
health status of enrollees, but the current risk-adjust-
ment system slightly overpays for low-cost healthy 
enrollees and significantly underpays for high-cost 
sick enrollees.11 Because MA plans have perennially 
resisted providing additional data to the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) that might 
improve the risk-adjustment system, the House bill 
includes a provision that directs the secretary of Health 
and Human Services to update the MA risk-adjustment 
mechanism. 
MA benchmarks are adjusted for differences in 
care utilization that result from MA plans’ extra ben-
efits and “aggressive coding.” Coding adjustments, 
though allowed under the Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005, had not been made prior to 2009, and the sec-
retary’s current authority to adjust for coding inten-
sity expires in 2010. Both the House and Senate bills 
extend or modify this authority. This provision is 
expected to save $15.5 billion in the House bill and 
$1.9 billion in the Senate bill over 10 years.
In addition, the Government Accountability 
Office has reported that CMS’s current authority 
to conduct audits is not adequate.12 The House bill 
increases the secretary’s audit authority. 
The House bill also expands the secretary’s 
authority and requirements to report plans’ medical loss 
ratios (MLRs). While MLR data is available to analysts 
because it is reported to the states and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, it is not readily available 
to beneficiaries during open-enrollment periods. The 
House bill penalizes plans with MLRs lower than 85 
percent by forbidding them to enroll new beneficiaries. 
If a plan has an MLR lower that 85 percent for five 
consecutive years, the secretary can disallow the plan 
from participating in the program.
Exhibit 3 summarizes the above and other  
proposed changes.
Exhibit 2. Geographic Unit of Medicare Advantage Plan Payment
House of Representatives (HR 3962) Senate (HR 3590)
Geographic Unit 
of Payment 
The secretary of HHS is directed to study the effects of 
calculating MA benchmarks on a broader geographic 
basis within one year of the law’s enactment. 
Payments in urban areas change to a system of multi-county core-based 
statistical areas (CBSAs). Benchmarks, bids, and payments continue to be 
made at the county level in rural areas. CBSA-based payments do not cross 
state lines. 
Beginning in 2012, payments in urban areas will be made by CBSAs within 
a state.
Beginning in 2012, bidding and service areas will be the same. Plans will 
be allowed to choose which payment areas they would like to serve, and in 
each case they must serve the entire area. 
The secretary is granted authority to adjust payment areas based on actual 
health care use and may make limited exceptions to plans with historical 
licensing agreements or historical capacity limits that preclude them from 
serving an entire payment area.
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Exhibit 3. Medicare Advantage Payment Process
House of Representatives (HR 3962) Senate (HR 3590)
Plan Bid Process No provision. Plan bids, reflecting their costs, must be certified by a member of the 
American Academy of Actuaries (beginning in 2012).
The secretary of HHS retains current authority to review, reject, and 
negotiate plan bids and to set actuarial standards for bids (beginning in 
2012).
The secretary is required to report plan actuaries who repeatedly do 
not comply with bidding rules and standards to the Actuarial Standards 
Board (beginning in 2012).
In areas where only one plan is offered, its costs will be paid (the bid will 
equal the benchmark). In areas where no plans are offered the previous 
year and multiple plans are offered the next year, the benchmark is a 
simple average of plan bids.
Benchmarks do not include the costs of regional, PACE, or 1876 cost 
plans.
Grandfathering of 
Benefits in Low-Bid 
Areas 
No provision. Beginning in 2012, plans will be able to grandfather extra benefits at 
the 2011 levels for enrollees in areas where average plan bids are at or 
below 75 percent of local FFS costs. 
Plans choosing to grandfather benefits can only offer them to the 
enrollees enrolled when legislation is enacted. Plans submit one bid for 
all enrollees. Plans with grandfathered enrollees receive rebates equal 
to the value of those enrollees’ 2011 benefits.
Extra benefits in grandfathered plans will be reduced by 5 percent each 
year, beginning in 2013. 
Quality or bonus payments will not be available to enrollees with 
grandfathered benefits. 
Bidding and risk adjustment occur as if there were no grandfathering 
policy, except that differences in utilization due to extra benefits—of 
up to 0.5 percent of the benchmark—can be factored into the risk 
adjustments.
Transitional Benefits No provision. Beginning in 2012, the secretary is required to provide transitional 
benefits to certain enrollees if they would experience a significant 
reduction in benefits. These enrollees include: 
Individuals in the country’s two largest metropolitan areas (New York • 
and Los Angeles) if extra benefits are greater than $100 per member 
per month.
People in plans where the 2011 benchmark is the legacy urban floor, • 
MA penetration is greater than 30 percent, and MA plan bids are 
below local FFS costs.
Plan members in counties that are contiguous to counties previously • 
described, as determined by the secretary.
The total funds available for transitional benefits would be $5 billion 
through 2019.
Risk Adjustment The secretary is directed to evaluate the MA risk-
adjustment system and report the findings to Congress 
within one year of enactment. 
Changes to the risk-adjustment system recommended 
by the secretary will be implemented by January 1, 
2012. 
No provision.
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Exhibit 3. Medicare Advantage Payment Process
House of Representatives (HR 3962) Senate (HR 3590)
Coding Intensity The secretary is given permanent authority to adjust 
payments for coding intensity.
Authority to adjust payments for coding intensity is extended through 
2013. The secretary is allowed to incorporate coding intensity 
adjustments into risk adjustments beginning in 2014.
Audit Authority The secretary is authorized to take action, including 
financial recovery, if overpayments to plans are 
discovered in audits beginning in 2011.
No provision.
Authority to Deny 
Plan Bids
The secretary is granted authority to deny plan bids 
beginning in 2011.
No provision.
Medical Loss Ratios Beginning in 2011, the secretary is required to publish 
each plan’s medical loss ratio. Beginning in 2012, 
the secretary, in consultation with the Health Choices 
commissioner, will establish standards for MLR 
reporting.
Beginning in 2014, plans with MLRs lower than 85 
percent must give the excess loss (below 85 percent) 
back to enrollees as a rebate premium the following 
year. 
Plans with MLR lower than 85 percent are not allowed 
to enroll new beneficiaries for three years.
The secretary is given the authority to terminate the 
contracts of plans with MLRs below 85 percent for five 
consecutive years. 
No provision.
BOnUSeS fOR qUAliTy And MAnAgeMenT
Medicare Advantage plans vary in the quality of ser-
vices and care provided to their members. Currently, 
CMS uses a composite of the scores of the Healthcare 
Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS), the 
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and 
Systems (CAHPS), and the Medicare Health Outcomes 
Survey (HOS) in order to determine a star rating for 
plans, with five stars representing the highest quality 
and one star the lowest.
MedPAC has indicated that measures of the 
quality of care provided by MA providers need to be 
improved, as they differ in comparison with other 
types of plans and also with FFS Medicare. In addition, 
MedPAC has recommended that MA plan payments 
should reflect plan performance on quality measures. 
If quality-related payments are indeed used to provide 
additional benefits to plan enrollees, plans with higher-
quality scores could prove more attractive. As shown in 
Exhibit 4, both the House and Senate bills include pro-
visions to improve quality measures and offer bonus 
payments based on plan performance.
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BenefiCiARy PROTeCTiOnS And 
enROllMenT-PROCeSS SiMPlifiCATiOn
MA plans have an incentive to enroll healthier individ-
uals, given that the MA risk-adjustment system slightly 
overpays for healthy beneficiaries and underpays con-
siderably for high-cost beneficiaries. Some MA plans 
may design out-of-pocket costs for benefits in ways 
that could discourage the enrollment of high-cost ben-
eficiaries. In response, both the House and Senate bills 
include provisions to limit MA plan out-of-pocket costs 
for enrollees who use health services, especially high-
cost services (Exhibit 5). 
The health insurance open-enrollment periods 
in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program and 
also in many other employee plans occur in the late 
fall. The House and Senate bills reduce the MA annual 
open-enrollment period to six or seven weeks each 
fall and eliminate a current open-enrollment period in 
January through March.
State insurance commissioners have docu-
mented marketing and advertising abuses by MA 
plans.13 The House bill explicitly allows states to inves-
tigate and enforce federal MA marketing requirements.
Exhibit 4. Quality Measures and Bonuses
House of Representatives (HR 3962) Senate (HR 3590)
Quality Measures Quality measures, determined by the secretary of 
HHS, are based on a star system that reflects a 
composite of HEDIS, CAHPS, and other clinical quality 
scores. The secretary is directed to report on the 
following as well:
admission and readmission rates• 
prevention quality (i.e., measures established by • 
AHRQ)
patient morbidity and mortality following surgery• 
measures of health, functioning, and survival of • 
chronic-disease patients.
patient safety• 
other outcomes and quality-of-life measures.• 
The secretary is given the authority to determine when 
and how the transition to new quality measures would 
occur.
Quality measures are determined by the secretary, who is given the 
authority to determine whether a five-star or other scale is appropriate. 
Quality measures are demographic and health status-adjusted. Bonuses 
must be used to provide additional benefits to enrollees.
Plans can receive a maximum of 6 percent of U.S. per capita costs of 
Medicare (USPCC) in bonuses.
The secretary may convert low-enrollment plans not otherwise eligible 
for bonuses into eligible plans, based on the regional or local-plan 
quality mean.
Care Coordination and 
Management Bonuses
No provision. Plans are eligible for bonuses of 0.5 percent of USPCC per activity, with 
a maximum of 2 percent, for offering any of the following eight care, 
coordination, and management activities beginning in 2014:
chronic-care management• 
patient education and disease self-management• 
transitional care interventions to coordinate care around a hospital • 
inpatient episode
patient safety• 
financial policies to promote care coordination by primary care • 
providers
medication management• 
health information technology • 
programs that address health disparities.• 
Quality Bonuses Plans rated with four or more stars are eligible for 
quality bonuses of 1.5 percent of the benchmark in 
2011, 3.0 percent in 2012, and 5 percent in 2013 and 
beyond. Only plans offered in counties with the lowest 
one-third of FFS costs, and with at least 20 percent 
of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in an MA plan, are 
eligible for bonuses.
Beginning in 2010, the secretary notifies plans if they 
are eligible for bonuses in the coming year.
Plans are eligible to receive a 4-percent bonus if they achieve a four- or 
five-star rating. Plans are eligible to receive a 2-percent bonus if they 
achieve a three-star rating (beginning in 2014). 
Plans are eligible to receive a 1-percent bonus if their rating is below 
three stars and their rating improves form the previous year (beginning 
in 2014).
 
New plans are eligible for a 2-percent bonus if they have certain 
structural measures of quality and network adequacy (beginning in 
2014). 
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Exhibit 5. Beneficiary Protections and Enrollment-Process Simplification





Beginning in 2011, MA plans must not impose a cost-
sharing regime for traditional Medicare benefits that 
imposes higher beneficiary costs than the cost-sharing 
system for the same benefits in FFS Medicare. 
Cost-sharing is allowed to take the form of coinsurance, 
copayments, or per-diem rates, provided the cost-sharing 
does not exceed that of FFS Medicare.
“Actuarially equivalent” cost-sharing is not allowed. 
Plans must not impose on dually eligible or qualified 
Medicare beneficiaries cost-sharing that is greater than 
the cost-sharing the enrollee would face if enrolled in his 
or her state’s Medicaid. 
Beginning in 2011, cost-sharing greater than in FFS Medicare is prohibited 
for selected services such as chemotherapy, renal dialysis, and skilled 
nursing care. The secretary has authority to identify the services to be 
included in this provision. Cost-sharing includes copayments, coinsurance, 
deductibles, and out-of-pocket caps on total beneficiary spending.
Plans are permitted to charge cost-sharing for Medicare-covered services 
when FFS Medicare does not charge cost-sharing.
Any out-of-pocket spending limits must apply to all Part A and B benefits 
with no exclusions. 
Beginning in 2012, plans must spend their rebates, premiums, and bonuses 
by first providing a “meaningful reduction” in Part A, B, and D cost-sharing. 
Plans must use the next share of rebates to add preventive and wellness 
benefits, and plans may use any remaining share to add benefits not 
covered by FFS Medicare. 
The current authority to reduce the Part B premium as an additional benefit 
is eliminated. 
Beginning in 2011, the secretary is required to categorize plans according 
to the share that rebates, bonuses, and supplemental premiums represent 
in each plan’s bid. Any marketing materials must reflect the plan’s category, 
such gold, silver, or bronze.
Plans are required to develop uniform exceptions and appeals processes by 
2012.
The secretary is required to: develop and maintain a complaint-tracking 
system—regarding complaints originated by MA and Part D enrollees—




Beginning in 2011, the annual enrollment period changes 
to November 1 to December 15. 
The three-month additional enrollment period, from 
January 1 to March 31, is eliminated. 
If enrollment in a plan is suspended, enrollees are 
allowed to opt out of the plan at any time and return to 
FFS Medicare. 
The secretary has the authority to allow enrollees in 
exceptional circumstances to change plans at any time.
Beginning in 2012, the annual enrollment period changes to October 15 to 
December 7. 
The three-month additional enrollment period is eliminated. 
Enrollees have 45 days (January 1 to February 15) to disenroll from the MA 





States are allowed to enforce federal marketing 
requirements for MA plans and recommend further 
sanctions to the secretary. Plans may not be penalized 
twice for the same violation.
No provision.
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SPeCiAl needS PlAnS And  
COST-BASed PlAnS
MA Special Needs Plans (SNPs), which were estab-
lished by the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 
(MMA), are extended and modified under both the 
House and Senate bills, as shown in Exhibit 6. The 
Senate bill provides for SNP payments to be set by its 
bid-based mechanism (described above, but the bill 
does not allow a SNP to charge premiums to enrollees 
if its bid is above the benchmark. 
Employer-sponsored group plans now operate 
under broad waiver authority included in the MMA. 
The House bill limits employer-sponsored MA plans in 
the following way: 90 percent of the MA-eligible indi-
viduals enrolled in the plan must reside in a county in 
which the MA organization offers a local MA plan. The 
Senate bill provides that the network requirement for 
Exhibit 6. Special Medicare Advantage Plans
House of Representatives (HR 3962) Senate (HR 3590)
Program of All-
Inclusive Care for 
the Elderly (PACE) 
Plans 
PACE plans are exempt from payment reductions. 
Benchmarks and payments follow current law.
PACE plans are exempt from the changes to MA benchmarks beginning in 2012. 




Authorization for SNP plans is extended until January 
1, 2013—or until January 1, 2016, for grandfathered 
plans, which are those that had contracts with state 
Medicaid agencies for “demonstrations serving those 
dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid” and that have 
a current contract with a state Medicaid agency. 
Beginning in 2011, SNP enrollment is limited to the 
annual enrollment period or to when the beneficiary is 
first diagnosed with a disease or condition that qualifies 
him or her for a SNP.
The secretary is directed to evaluate and report to 
Congress on the impact of SNP plans on cost, quality 
of care, patient satisfaction, and other subjects by 
December 31, 2011.
Authorization for SNP plans is extended through December 31, 2013. 
Starting in January 1, 2010, and by January 1, 2013, SNP plans must have only 
those beneficiaries enrolled that meet the definition for its type of SNP. By 2013, 
enrollees in plans that do not meet the definition established for a SNP plan will 
be transitioned to a non-SNP MA plan or to FFS Medicare. Exceptions are made 
for individuals who are no longer eligible for Title XIX medical assistance.
By January 1, 2013, all dual-eligible SNPs will need to have contracts in place 
with state Medicaid programs in order to serve dual-eligibles. 
All plan payment changes will apply to SNPs, though they may not be able to 
charge premiums if their bids exceed the new benchmark. 
SNPs that are fully integrated under Titles 18 and 19 of the Social Security Act 
are eligible to receive frailty adjustments similar to those used for PACE plans. 
In 2011 and periodically afterward, the secretary must create a new budget-
neutral risk adjustment for SNPs to replace the default risk score of other MA 
plans. 
Beginning in 2013, SNPs must be certified by the NCQA. 
Reasonable Cost 
Contract Plans 
Authority for reasonable cost contract plans is extended 
until January 1, 2012. 
The meaning of “service area” is clarified. 
Authority for reasonable-cost contract plans is extended until January 1, 2013, 
regardless of any other MA plans serving the area. 
Private Fee-For-
Service Plans 
No provision. When specifying areas where PFFS must establish contracts, “network area” is 
defined as on that is served by two or more MA organizations. 
Erickson 
Demonstrations 
A Medicare Senior Housing program is created. Entities 
that qualify to offer Senior Housing program plans 
include those that offered a plan under the Erickson 
demonstration to individuals residing in continuing 
care communities (which provide onsite primary care 
services, offer transportation to providers outside the 
facility, and use health information technology). 
Payments to these plans are capped at either current 
MA payments or the cost of caring for the same 
enrollees under FFS Medicare, whichever is greater.
Beginning in 2011, Erickson demonstration plans are allowed to become a type 
of SNP if they serve beneficiaries who reside in continuous care environments, 
have a sufficient number of on-site primary care providers (as determined by the 
secretary), supply transportation benefits to other providers, and have been in 
existence under a demonstration for at least one year. 
Employer Group 
Plans
The authorization for waivers for employer-sponsored 
group plans that offer coverage outside their service 
area is limited as follows: 90 percent of the MA-eligible 
individuals enrolled in the plan must reside in a county in 
which the MA organization offers a local MA plan.
The secretary may waive private FFS network requirements for employer-
sponsored private FFS plans in a manner similar to the waiver of requirements 
for employer-sponsored coordinated care plans.
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employer-sponsored private-fee-for-service plans may 
be waived in a manner similar to the waiver of require-
ments for employer-sponsored coordinated-care plans. 
Provisions in both bills also deal with other types of 
plans, such as reasonable-cost contract plans. 
The bills contain several other provisions that 
affect special MA plans, including Program of All-
Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE) plans—which 
are intended to help keep frail elders in the community 
and out of nursing homes—and plans that provide 
on-site health care for residents of continuing-care 
communities.
MA private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans are 
MA plans authorized to operate without contracts 
with physicians and other providers. The Medicare 
Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 
requires PFFS plans in counties with other MA plans 
to establish provider networks by 2011. The Senate bill 
clarifies that such counties are those with two or more 
MA organizations. It also allows waiver of these pro-
vider-network requirements for employer PFFS plans. 
COnClUSiOnS
Although the House and Senate bills take somewhat 
different approaches to changing the MA program, 
they both attempt to achieve the same goal of elimi-
nating the extra payments to private plans. They are 
motivated by the fact that these monetary supplements 
presently increase Medicare spending, provide addi-
tional benefits to some but not all beneficiaries, and 
diminish the incentive for private plans to provide care 
more efficiently than traditional Medicare—the origi-
nal purpose of including private plans as an option for 
Medicare beneficiaries. These bills’ common strategy 
is to encourage MA plans to provide coordinated care 
for their enrollees more efficiently and effectively 
than could be provided under the traditional Medicare 
program, with its reliance on fee-for-service payment. 
While the specifics of the bills differ, they both intend 
to improve the value that Medicare obtains for the  
dollars it spends.
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